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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003713

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SUBJECT: LEGISLATIVE TOUR D'HORIZON WITH INFLUENTIAL COR LEADER ALI AL-ADIB

Classified By: Political Counselor Matt Tueller for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (C) Dawa Party Deputy Bloc leader Ali al-Adib told S/I Satterfield on November 10 that his party and Prime Minister al-Maliki favor submission of the Council of Ministers draft of the De-Baathification law for Council of Representatives (CoR) debate, with the possibility that amendments could later be introduced to bring the draft more in line with the leaders' draft. He predicted the Sunni Tawafuq Bloc would oppose the bill, thus providing cover for others to do the same. Adib complained about an "unfair" Kurdish approach on the draft Hydrocarbons Framework Law and urged USG pressure to facilitate compromise. Adib said the Shia coalition had prepared a solid draft Provincial Powers bill that would go forward after the De-Baath Law debate. He complained at length about claimed efforts by Vice President al-Hashemi to stymie political progress; cautioned about the long-term effects of tribal "awakening" movements; and warned about public perceptions of an MNF-I tilt toward Sunnis in the Concerned Local Citizens (CLC) program. When asked about a long-term bilateral security partnership, Adib stated that Iraqis want to work together to battle al-Qaeda in a way that does not embarrass GOI leaders. End Summary

De-Baath Law: Tawafuq Opposition Opens Door to Nay-Sayers

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¶2. (C) After Satterfield emphasized the critical importance of CoR passage in the current session of the so-called leaders' draft of the De-Baathification Law (Law on Accountability and Justice), Adib said that Dawa favors submission of the competing Council of Ministers draft to the CoR with the possibility that amendments could later be introduced to bring the draft more in line with the leaders' draft. He said that Maliki and the Kurdish parties support this approach as well. When asked to speculate on the CoR's likely handling of this matter, Adib predicted that the Sunni Tawafuq Bloc would oppose the bill, thus providing cover for the Sadrist and some in the Shia United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) coalition to also oppose the bill on the grounds that the draft already contains significant Shia concessions. He opined that Tawafuq and others are determined to deny the GOI political achievements. Satterfield noted that the Council of Ministers would meet on November 13 to consider whether to withdraw its draft and put forward the leaders' draft for CoR debate. Regarding a possible submission of the leaders' draft by the Presidency Council, Adib responded that, apart from possible constitutional implications surrounding this matter, such a move would be a mistake as it would signal that the CoR and Iraq's top leaders are in dispute: better to go forward with the Council of Ministers draft, he stated, and amend it later according to the will of the parliament.

Hydrocarbons Framework Law: "Provocative" Kurdish Conduct

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¶3. (C) Satterfield briefly recounted his recent meetings

with Masood and Nechirvan Barzani about pending national oil and gas laws, noting that he had expressed USG support for laws acceptable to all Iraqis and USG displeasure over unilateral Kurdish oil and gas contracts that complicate enactment of such laws. Adib replied that these contracts are "provocative" not only to non-Kurd Iraqis but also to Iraq's neighbors, who view the deals as assertions of Kurdish independence. He questioned the fairness of the Kurd position of demanding exclusive rights over revenues from oil/gas deposits located within its territory while also insisting on a 17 percent share of revenues from deposits found outside its territory, and Adib predicted that others in Iraq would soon want the same deal for themselves. Adib asked that the USG lean hard on the Kurds to bring them around to compromise on the Hydrocarbons Law as well as the draft bill on Distribution of Financial Resources. He opined that the recent PKK-Turkey flare-up had made the Kurds better aware of their relative weakness, characterizing the Kurdish announcement that the PKK is a terrorist organization as a concession that betrayed weakness.

Provincial Powers Law

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¶4. (C) Adib said the UIA had prepared a solid draft that the CoR would take up after the De-Baath Law debate. He said that possible points of dispute could revolve around the extent of authority given to provincial councils: after examples of abuses of authority in Basrah, Diwaniyah and other places, the UIA decided to limit such authority more than they had originally thought necessary. Adib said that Iraq's experience of centralism under the former regime had been very harsh for Shia and the Kurds, and therefore they favored federalism. However, what passes for "federalism" in

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Kurdistan is actually confederation, and the Kurds are providing a bad example to the rest of Iraqis who will someday demand a similar arrangement for themselves, thus greatly weakening the central government. He said that the goal of true federalism is for the central government to assist the provinces in maximizing their potential.

Complaints about Hashemi, Caution on "Awakening" and CLCs

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¶5. (C) Warming to a theme that has come up repeatedly during Satterfield's discussions with leading Iraqi political figures, Adib complained at length about Vice President Tareq al-Hashemi's attempts to stymie political progress. He accused Hashemi of casting a de facto veto on 28 pieces of approved legislation by refusing to sign them, and of preventing Tawafiq cabinet ministers from returning to their posts. He claimed that senior officials in Hashemi's Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) had expressed dissatisfaction with his leadership, and he predicted that Sunni tribal leaders will not support the IIP in future local elections as they believe the IIP has poorly represented their interests and prevented their areas from receiving much-needed reconstruction funding. In reply to Satterfield's question about views on local "awakening" movements, the smooth-talking legislator opined that such movements are good short-term measures to fight terrorism but over the long term are negative as they encourage competition and division among tribes. Instead, Adib averred the GOI should better promote the concept of citizenship, and Satterfield added the GOI must follow this with better provision of services and funding.

¶6. (C) Adib claimed that current Sunni-Shia tensions in Baghdad were based largely on socio-economic differences and the presence of organized crime, while a high level of sectarian tension remains in "complex" Diyala province. After Adib delivered a monologue on Saddam's exploitation of religion to divide Sunnis and Shia after the 1991 Kuwait war, he complained that Coalition Forces appear to be empowering armed Sunni groups through the Concerned Local Citizens (CLC)

program. When asked for views about a long-term bilateral security partnership, Adib acknowledged Iraq's need for continuing economic and security support but stated that the GOI wants a system in which the GOI and the U.S. work together to battle al-Qaeda and that U.S. efforts to this end are properly coordinated with the GOI to avoid embarrassing Iraq's leaders.

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